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Deborah A. Melle submits this reply brief in support of her
cross-appeal.
POINT I
MS. MELLE HAS MET THE MARSHALING REQUIREMENT
As

a

preliminary

objection

to

every

point

raised

in

Ms. Melle's cross-appeal, Dr. Bova perfunctorily claims Ms. Melle
has failed to marshal the evidence.

She has met the marshaling

requirement with respect to each argument in her cross-appeal.
Ms. Melle's first argument on cross-appeal, that the trial
court improperly failed to include income from Dr. Bova's second
job in computing alimony and child support awards, does not challenge a factual finding of the trial court.

Rather, she challenges

the legal reasoning employed by the trial court in refusing to add
income

from

income."

Dr. Bova's

second

job

in determining

his

"gross

Two factual findings, neither of which she contests, are

relevant to her argument, the first being that Dr. Bova
as an independent contractor, reviews medical case files
for the Worker's Compensation Fund of Utah.
In said
capacity, the Defendant works approximately four hours
per week1 and charges $125.00 per hour.
(R. 1637).

x

The trial court made a typographical error. It should read
"the Defendant works approximately eight hours per month and
charges $125.00 per hour."
1

Second,

the trial

court

found

monthly

income

1994

from

(R. 163 8).

in

In determining

that Dr. Bova's
the

to

Spine

ignore

Center
income

adjusted
was
earned

gross

$9,583.00.
from the

Worker's Compensation Fund of Utah in computing Dr. Bova's alimony
and child support obligations, the trial court drew the legal
conclusion that only income prior to the filing of this action in
August 1994 was relevant.

(R. 1638).

Ms. Melle contests a legal

conclusion, not a factual finding, in arguing that income earned
while the parties were still married but after the divorce action
was filed must also be considered.
Ms. Melle's second argument on cross-appeal, that the trial
court erred in making her pay a portion of the tax burden for the
-IRA funds Dr. Bova improperly withdrew, similarly challenges a
legal conclusion of the trial court.

Ms. Melle's argument is that

accepting the trial court's factual findings in support of its
ruling as true, it is still unfair to force her to bear a tax
burden incurred solely because of Dr. Bova's improper withdrawal of
IRA funds.
Ms. Melle's third argument on cross-appeal is that the trial
court

should have extrapolated beyond the Base Combined Child

Support Obligation Table set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.14
in determining Dr. Bova's child support obligation.

2

In setting

child support at $1,400.00 per month, which is the child support
award the Table shows should be set for a combined gross monthly
income of $10,100.00, the trial court relied on the facts that
Ms. Melle's gross monthly income was $2,386.00 and that Dr. Bova's
was $9,583.00.

(R. 1638).

Although this combined monthly income

exceeds the maximum income level shown in the Table, the trial
court declined Ms. Melle's request to extrapolate beyond the Table
and set child support higher than $1,400.00 per month.

The trial

court offered no factual findings for why it was refusing her
request, and Ms. Melle is not required to guess what the factual
basis might have been.

If the trial court does ' not offer any

insight into the evidentiary basis for its decision, it is impossible to marshal the evidence.

Campbell v. Campbell, 896 P.2d 635

(Utah App. 1995); Woodward v. Fazzio, 823 P.2d 474

(Utah App.

1991).
The fourth argument on cross-appeal is that the trial court
should

have granted

discovered

evidence

her motion
that

for new

Dr. Bova

trial

dissipated

based

on newly

marital

assets.

Ms. Melle disputes the trial court's factual finding that she could
have discovered the evidence before trial.

(R. 1855).

The trial

court provided no subsidiary facts supporting this finding, but
simply stated in conclusory fashion in its order denying her motion

3

that she could have discovered the evidence beforehand.

(R. 1855) .

Marshaling the evidence does not require pure guesswork; Ms. Melle
does not know why the trial court felt she could have discovered
the evidence before trial because Judge Noel did not explain why.
See Campbell and Woodward. supra.
Ms. Melle's last point on cross-appeal is not an argument, but
a request for relief.

She asks for attorney fees on appeal based

on the law that when a party receives attorney fees in a divorce
case at the trial court and that party prevails on appeal, attorney
fees on appeal are warranted.

Dr. Bova chides Ms. Melle for not

marshaling the evidence on this request for relief, but she is not
disputing a factual finding in making this request.
This Court should disregard Dr. Bova's claim that Ms. Melle
has

not

marshaled

the

evidence

Ms. Melle's cross-appeal.

and

focus

on

the

merits

of

Her arguments on cross-appeal largely

challenge the trial court's legal conclusions, and in the few
instances where she disputes factual findings, the trial court did
not

reveal

the

basis

for

those

impossible.

4

findings,

making

marshaling

POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING
TO INCLUDE INCOME FROM DR. BOVA'S SECOND JOB
IN COMPUTING ALIMONY AND CHILD SUPPORT.
Dr. Bova has repeatedly protested an increase in alimony or
child support payments based on his alleged inability to afford an
increase, as opposed to protesting on the basis of his ex-wife's
and children's lack of need.

He has thus made his entire income,

including that earned from his second job, an issue.
Dr. Bova began earning $125,000.00 per year as a physician
with the Spine Center in 1991.

(R. 2264-2267).

In 1993, he

entered a new contract with the Spine Center that allowed him the
potential to earn more money.2

(R. 2268, 2281).

Dr. Bova points

out in his Reply Brief that during the winter of 1992-1993 he also
took on a second job, earning $800.00 and ski discounts as a ski
instructor.

(R. 2258, 2494).

In 1995, after Ms. Melle filed for

divorce, he took on a different second job reviewing files for the
Utah Worker's Compensation Fund.

(R. 2299).

2

The trial court found

For example, Dr. Bova earned gross income of $11,586.64 in
January 1994; $16,282.28 in February 1994; $10,178.83 in March
1994; $11,309.26 in April 1994; $10,755.06 in May 1994; $10,800.93
in June 1994; and $15,300.48 in July 1994. (Plaintiff's Exhibit
19; R. 2291).
5

that

Dr.

Bova

earns

$1000.00

monthly

from

this

second

job.3

(R. 1637).
Ms. Melle urged the trial court to consider income from this
second job in computing child support and alimony, but the trial
court declined to do so on the basis that only the income he earned
prior

to the

filing

of

this

parties' marriage, was relevant.

action, albeit

still

during

the

However, income from a second job

must be considered if it was a source of income during the parties'
marriage.

Breinholt v. Breinholt. 905 P.2d 877 (Utah App. 1995).

It is undisputed that the parties were still married in 1995.

The

income Dr. Bova earned in 1995 from the Utah Worker's Compensation
Fund is therefore relevant to computing child support and alimony
obligations.

The trial court disregarded established Utah case law

in deciding to compute child support and alimony based on income
earned at the time the divorce action was filed.
Dr. Bova contends that even if the trial court used income
earned during the marriage as the benchmark for determining alimony

3

Dr. Bova attempts to downplay his second job by claiming that
there was only one month that he earned $1,000.00 reviewing files.
(Reply Brief of Appellant, p. 13, n.8). The trial court found
otherwise, however, noting that the second job provided a regular
stream of $1,000.00 extra in monthly income. (R. 1637). Dr. Bova
testified that he has put in two hours per week at this second job
and has charged $125.00 per hour since the spring of 1994. (R.
2299-2301.)
6

and child support, it still would have had to ignore the income
earned from his second job in determining child support because he
worked more than forty hours weekly at the Spine Center.

This

argument is unavailing; while Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.5(2) states
that

courts

typically

should

consider

income

earned

from

the

equivalent of one forty-hour-per-week job in setting child support,
it also provides that income earned in excess of this may be considered if the payor ''normally and consistently" works more than
forty hours per week.

With regard to alimony, extra income from

overtime or a second job has always been viewed as relevant to
setting alimony awards.
(Utah App. 1994)

See Crompton v. Crompton, 888 P. 2d 686

(husband's history of working overtime during

marriage justified higher alimony award).

This was the case with

Dr. Bova.
Dr. Bova suggests, without any citation to the record, that he
was forced to find a second job at the Worker's Compensation Fund
because that was the only way he could pay his temporary child
support and alimony obligations.4
13).

(Reply Brief of Appellant, p.

Nonetheless, working more than forty hours per week, whether

it was through a second job or from working long hours at his job

4

This suggestion is suspicious in view of the fact that Dr.
Bova was able to afford several vacations for himself during this
period of alleged indigence. (R. 1499-1500).
7

with the Spine Center, was normal for Dr. Bova during the marriage.
He had a second job as a ski instructor in the winter of 1992-1993.
In addition to the twenty-six hours per week

he spent

seeing

patients at the Spine Center, he also testified that he logged
several

hours

weekly

dictating

notes

"studying and reading and research."

from

these

(R. 2295).

visits

and

Furthermore, he

testified that he acts as an expert witness in lawsuits and charges
$450-$500 per hour, which earnings apparently go to the Spine
Center.

(R. 2296-2298).

on non-clinical

work

at

If his testimony that the hours he spent
the

Spine

Center

actually

made

this

employment a forty-hour-plus job is to be believed, he established
a practice of working more than forty hours per week long before
the parties separated.

Beginning in August 1991, when he commenced

employment with the Spine Center, he worked there five days a week,
eleven to twelve hours per day.
The trial court

(R. 1904-05) .

incorrectly

refused

to take

into account

income earned from Dr. Bova's second job in setting alimony on the
basis that only income earned at the time of filing the divorce
action is relevant.

Utah law is clear that all income earned

during the parties' marriage, whether they are separated or not, or
whether a divorce action has been filed or not, must be included in
setting alimony.

8

The

trial

court

also

should

have

considered

income

Dr. Bova's second job in determining child support.
worked

from

Even if he

in excess of forty hours weekly with the two jobs, he

historically worked that much during the marriage, and the children
are entitled to the financial benefit of those excess hours.
POINT III
MS. MELLE SHOULD NOT SHARE THE TAX
BURDEN OF DR. BOVA'S IMPROPER WITHDRAWAL OF
IRA FUNDS WHEN HE DEPRIVED HER OF ANY INPUT AS
TO WHEN THE FUNDS WERE WITHDRAWN.
Although Ms. Melle had already

filed her

1994

state and

federal income tax returns at the time of trial, the court ordered
the parties to file a joint tax return for 1994 and to share the
tax

liability

of

$16,000.00.

The

trial

court

found

that

substantial portion" of the tax liability was attributable

u

a

to

Dr. Bova's withdrawal of IRA funds in violation of the court's
prior order.
to

order

a

(R. 1642).
joint

return

While it was proper for the trial court
on

the

ground

that

the

overall

tax

liability would be less, it was improper for the court to require
Ms. Melle to pay the portion of the tax liability incurred due to
Dr. Bova's illegal withdrawal of IRA funds.
There is no evidence that Ms. Melle benefited from any of the
funds Dr. Bova illegally withdrew.

Dr. Bova maintains he used

$22,960.00 of the proceeds to pay state and federal taxes to the
9

benefit of both parties, yet he was unable to produce documentation
proving this.

Furthermore, Ms. Melle had no say in when the funds

were withdrawn.

Had Dr. Bova not withdrawn the funds in violation

of the court's order but instead waited until both parties agreed
upon an optimal time for withdrawal, Ms. Melle could have agreed to
withdrawal at a time when she was in a better financial position to
share

any

tax

liability

incurred

from

a

future

withdrawal.

Dr. Bova deprived her of this opportunity, and the trial court
disregarded this in requiring her to pay half of the tax liability
incurred due to his illegal withdrawal.
POINT IV
CHILD SUPPORT SHOULD BE SET BY
EXTRAPOLATING BEYOND THE CHILD SUPPORT TABLE.
The highest level of combined monthly income shown on the Base
Combined

Child

$10,100.00.

The

Support

Obligation

corresponding

children is $1,400.00.

Table

child

("the

support

Table")

amount

for

is
two

The fact that the Table stops at these

figures does not mean that $1,4 00.00 is the maximum amount of child
support available for two children.

Rather, courts are permitted

to extrapolate beyond these figures if parents earn more than
$10,100.00 combined adjusted gross monthly income to reflect the
actual income earned by the parents.

10

The support for the parties' children should not artificially
be limited at $1,400.00 when the combined adjusted gross monthly
income is $1,869.00 higher than what is shown in the Table.

The

trial court offered no reason for why it was depriving the children
of child support based on their parents' actual income, despite
Ms. Melle's urging that the children maintain as similar a standard
of

living

as

they

enjoyed

when

their

parents

were

married.

Dr. Bova contends that the children should not receive more child
support because he has more visitation than what is provided in the
standard visitation schedule, but he forgets his stipulation that
"irrespective of the amount of the days per month that the defendant has the children

for visitation

that he would pay child

support pursuant to the sole custody worksheet," which worksheet
requires reference to the Table.

(R. 1638).

There is no reason to deprive the children of the maximum
level of child support allowed by law.

The children are entitled

to as similar a financial lifestyle as they had during the marriage, and increasing the child support amount by extrapolation
will achieve this result.

11

POINT V
MS. MELLE'S MOTION FOR NEW
TRIAL ON THE ISSUE OF WHETHER MARITAL
MONIES WERE IMPROPERLY DEPOSITED
INTO THE TRUST ACCOUNT SHOULD HAVE
BEEN GRANTED.
Dr. Bova faults Ms. Melle for failing to discover before trial
that he had deposited a large sum money into his daughter's trust
account right before the parties separated.

Nonetheless, he is the

very reason she failed to discover this information -- she asked
him during the discovery process to list all accounts in his name,
and he did not list the trust account for his daughter in his name.
Having breached his duty to disclose requested information, he
cannot now claim that she should have found what he prevented her
from finding.
It is undisputed that Ms. Melle asked Dr. Bova through pretrial discovery requests to list all accounts in his name.

It is

undisputed that he failed to list a trust account he set up for his
daughter, along with two trust accounts set up for the children
born of the marriage.

She learned of the existence of these trust

accounts two weeks before trial, when Dr. Bova gave her a threepage document she would later introduce at trial as Exhibit P-9.
(R. 2173-74).

This document contained a balance for each of the

three accounts as of October 7, 1995, but contained no information
12

as to when money had been deposited into these accounts.
discovered

information

regarding

the timing

She only

of deposits

after

trial, when she was cleaning out his desk and found a document that
he had kept from her showing a balance of approximately $3,000.00
just prior to the parties' separation.

The balance at the time of

trial was $16,000.00, suggesting that Dr. Bova improperly diverted
almost $13,000.00 into the account after the parties separated.
Ms. Melle diligently attempted to discover the existence of any
account Dr. Bova might have opened for his daughter when she asked
in

pre-trial

discovery

for

all

accounts

in

his

name.

His

obstreperous failure to list the daughter's account prevented her
from

learning

of

its

existence

until

just

before

trial, and

therefore prevented her from inquiring about when any deposits were
made in~o that account.

The trial court's denial of her motion for

a new trial on the issue of whether the $13,000.00 deposit was
improper and penalized her for his deceptive behavior.
CONCLUSION
The child support and alimony awards set by the trial court
should be adjusted upward to reflect income earned from Dr. Bova's
second job and the parties' actual income.

Additionally, Ms. Melle

should not be required to bear a tax burden that Dr. Bova created
in violation of the trial court's order.

13

A new trial should be

granted on the issue of whether Dr. Bova improperly deposited
marital

monies

Ms. Melle

into

his

daughter's

should be awarded attorney

trust

account.

Finally,

fees if she prevails on

appeal.
DATED this

/ /

day of November, 1997.
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